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Abstract
Social sciences start by looking at the social-psychological attributes of humans to model and
explain their observed behavior. However, we suggest starting the study of observed human
behavior with the universal laws of physics, e.g., the principle of minimum action. In our
proposed three-tier framework, behavior is a manifestation of action driven by physical,
biological, and social-psychological principles at the core, intermediate, and top tier,
respectively. More broadly, this reordering is an initial step towards building a platform for
reorganizing the research methods used for theorizing and modeling behavior. This
perspective outlines and illustrates how a physical law can account for observed human
behavior and sketches the elements of a broader agenda.
JEL Classification: B30, B40, D01
Keywords: Human behavior, physics, biology, social sciences
Introduction
In the history of thought, animal action has been intertwined with some form of intent,
purpose, teleology, or goal, whether deliberate, habitual, or hardwired. Decision theory, at
least since von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1 axiomatization of “reasonable behavior” 2,
1

was built on the shared assumption of intentionality in game theory-3 and operations
research. These logic-based formulations of “reasonable behavior,” though subject to
criticism by philosophers 4, economists 5,6, and other scholars 7,8,9, claim a considerable
command in the study of human behavior with variations in methodology, but a general
consensus on fundamentals. Engineers have paid close and continuing attention to
optimizing schemes in biological systems 10, as well as embedding robots with various forms
of consciousness 11. Cognitive scientists have explored the architecture of the mind, while
questioning how mental and physical existence get combined 12,13, and also studied the
nature of inquiry that precedes action 14. However, modeling and understanding human
behavior independently of reason and intention is not without precedent. For example,
markets populated by simple “zero-intelligence” (ZI) agents stripped of all cognition can yield
aggregate level outcomes that capture important aspects of markets, in particular allocative
efficiency 15. The work on movement of pedestrian crowds modeled as a physical
phenomenon 16,17 and the use of the free-energy principle for constructing a unified brain
theory 18,19 are other examples of such work. Here, we are not offering a reductionist
account, nor a normative one. In its first order of approximation, our approach seeks an
understanding of observed behavior with the help of physical laws before resorting to
biology or higher human faculties.

Certain similarities among the three examples illustrated in Figure 1 lead us to entertain the
possibility that granting priority to intent may not necessarily be the best way to understand
at least some aspects of human behavior, even when it appears to be conscious and
controlled. Consider (1) a lifeguard rushing across a sandy beach and swimming through
water to rescue a drowning child; (2) ants making their way from their hill to a food source
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(sugar), traversing both smooth and coarse surfaces before returning home; and (3) photons
traveling from the sun through space and water to enter the eye of a fish swimming
underwater. All three could follow a straight line or minimum distance path 20,21. Instead,
they follow a kinked path that obeys Fermat’s Principle that the travel time to reach the end
point is minimized (also stated as Snell-Descartes’ law equating the ratio of sines of the
angles of incidence at the kink to the ratio of velocities in the two media—sand and water,
smooth and rough surfaces, and empty space and water, respectively, in the three
examples).

Figure 1: Lifeguard, Ants, and Sunbeam: All Follow a Kinked Path across Two Media

Do the apparent similarities among the paths that humans, ants, and photons take,
illustrated in the three panels of Figure 1 follow some fundamental principle common to the
three examples? Or is it simply a case of the same mathematical model that happens to
capture diverse and unrelated phenomena in different domains? Viewed in terms of
cognitive abilities alone, purpose, intent, motivation, learning, and free will are easily
attributed to the lifeguard. With effort, some of these might also be stretched to fit the
behavior of ants. However, it strains credulity to associate these attributes with photons or
electromagnetic radiation. At a biological level, the behavior of the lifeguard and the ants
can be understood as conforming to energy conservation, which is most often in an
3

organism’s survival interest. But can we systematize these empirically observed phenomena
within the structure of a physical law across these three very different but commonplace
(non-exotic) contexts? Our proposal, as outlined in the following section, aims to do just
that. In this instance, we suggest using the principle of least action. As our framework
expands, other laws of physics could be more suitable candidates to serve as organizing
principles for observed behavior.

The principle of least action and the physics of human behavior

In classical mechanics, the path of least action is the path along which the sum (integral) of
the difference between the kinetic energy and potential energy, at every point in time, is
minimized 22. We propose using this principle to isolate the elements of human action that
arise based on our physical existence from elements attributable to biology and the higher
faculties.

Proposition: Of all possible paths from a beginning point A to an end
point B, the materially efficient path uses minimal action, where action
is a scalar that corresponds to the dimension in which value has been
conserved.

What remains is to specify the particular value conserved in the context of observed
behavior. Thereafter, to the extent that the path followed by humans coincides with the
path of least action, physical laws suffice for understanding it. Note that we do not propose
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the physically efficient path as a normative standard and consequently do not advocate
approaching it to “improve” behavior. Instead, to the extent that the observed path
deviates from this physically efficient path, an explanation for such deviations will be sought
in biology and social-psychological attributes associated with the biological endowments of
animals as well as in higher faculties of humans. These higher tiers of the proposed structure
call for an alternative, nonphysical apparatus. Thus positioned, our approach avoids the
controversy over the suitability of mechanically driven benchmarks for the study of human
behavior. Our three-tier framework can be visualized as a sphere with a physical core and a
biological middle layer, wrapped in a social-psychological cover. A first step in constructing
this framework is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 shows six possibilities of a path of least action between a beginning point A and an
end point B. In each case (a numbered row in Table 1), a path in a specified space is
generated by minimizing action with respect to the “action element” indicated in column 3.
In each case, elements exogenous to action are listed under column 2. Moving down the
table from rows 1 to 6, the complexity increases and the space has more dimensions or
properties. Nonetheless, the action is defined in the physical sense, even when higher-tier
attributes are involved. Our main contribution is the very specification of an action element
that is configured on the physical level. Deliberately confining ourselves to the laws of
physics, we examine at this tier (the physical core) the extent to which behavior can be
captured and characterized. We remain cognizant that nonphysical understanding is called
for when examining nonphysical aspects of behavior. Examples of nonphysical aspects are
natural selection 23 and survival of the fittest 24,25 in biological or social evolution 26,27,28,
deliberate processes such as mathematical/logical or algorithmic ones 29, and partially or
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fully subconscious processes such as heuristic and intuitive decisions 30. Thus, the modeling
strategy of starting from the physical tier permits as many physical laws as possible to be
attributed to this core tier, without seeking help from the outer biological and socialpsychological tiers at this stage.

Table 1: Extending the principle of least action to account for behavior

1

2

3

4

5

1: Description 2: Fixed/
exogenous
element
Going from
Beginning and
point A to
end in Euclidian
point B in
space
Euclidian 2-D
space
Going from A Beginning and
to B in a force end in a gravity
field
(or any other
force) field
Moving from Beginning and
A on one
end in Euclidian
fabric to B on space across
a different
change in the
fabric in same fabric
space
Moving from Time a fly ball
A to a specific takes to reach
end B at (or
1.5 m above
before) a
ground;
given time
No need to
know B or time
“Save wire”
Location of
organizing
ganglia in a
principle
combinatorial
space

Use the
6 simplest
model
sufficient for
action

One cue is
valued more
than others

3: Action/
economized
element
Euclidian
distance

4: Example

Physical
action
(minimal
energy)
Time

A ball thrown
in the air at an
angle

Keep a fixed
angle of gaze
(change=0)

Baseball player
catches a fly
ball

Minimal cost
(length) of
connections
among
ganglia
Use only the
cue of
maximum
validity

5: Path

Connecting
A straight line
two dots in 2-D
Euclidian space

Lifeguard
rescues a
drowning
swimmer

A parabola
derived from
minimal
action
Kinked line
under SnellDescartes’
law

A curved
path,
depending on
when the
angle of gaze
is first fixed
Ganglia
A path of
connections in fiber
the nematode connections
nervous
with minimal
system
length of
connections
Single-criterion A nondecisioncompensatory
making
structure: 1,
½, ¼, ….
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A broad range of actions is illustrated in the six rows of Table 1 using physical properties
only. Row 1 configures the simplest case of physically moving from point A to point B, where
both are exogenously given on a plane, the action element is Euclidean distance, and the
resulting path is a straight line on the plane, which minimizes the distance.

Row 2 presents a familiar path of minimum action that a ball thrown in the air takes in the
force field of gravity to return to the ground. Row 3 provides a decomposition of the
phenomena in Figure 1, captured in Snell-Descartes law, as an application of the general
principle of least action. Here, the action element that is minimized is time instead of
distance, the fourth dimension in Minkowski space31.

Row 4 implements the idea of using physics to explain behavior. The action element here is
not a new dimension but a physical attribute, the (change in the) angle of gaze. The
exogenous element here is time, and execution of action does not require the actor’s
preliminary knowledge of the specific endpoint. Although a biological construct is likely at
work 32—referred to in the literature as the gaze heuristic 33—under the action element in
Column 3, our proposed configuration requires only the fixed angle of gaze. Keeping the
changes to a minimum (ideally zero) is based not on the evolutionary capacity of maintaining
the gaze (that resides in the biological brain) but on a physical element. Thus, this
configuration remains in the physical tier.

Row 5 takes a biological phenomenon — connections among the ganglia of the neural
system in a tiny worm (nematode) — that minimizes the total length of wiring. This
configuration assumes fixed ganglia locations for which connecting paths have been
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optimized, and thus does not include the possibility that the location of ganglia and
connections are co-determined 34. With this caveat, external elements are specified along
with an efficient path (network of connections) resulting from a minimization of action as
measured by the length of connections.

The last row in Table 1 (Row 6) presents problem-solving behavior viewed as an act of
moving from the problematic beginning to a resolved end. This signifies the use of a very
simple heuristic, one-reason decision-making, for solving the problem at hand 35,36. The
external requirements or non-action elements are specific structures in the task
environment that lend themselves to such solutions. Here, economizing an action element
does not involve the cognitive effort spent on the search for relevant cues and the
subsequent choice of only one cue/reason from the set of all available cues. Our formulation
seeks to capture the action only after one cue is chosen. In this case, the efficiency (and
simplicity) of the action arises from considering and acting upon one cue only, instead of
taking the effort to weigh and add many cues. The path in this case is an abstract
interpretation, a mathematical series that corresponds to the non-compensatory structure
of the cues’ environment. The caveat concerning the unknown amount of effort required for
judging which cue applies in a certain situation also applies to this formulation 37. Populating
this table — i.e., representing observed behavior in terms of an action element, exogenous
factors, and a path — generates physical configurations of observed behaviors in terms of
the principle of least action. As we move forward with our broader agenda, it is plausible to
expect that other physical laws will gradually enter the stage.

8

What we have discussed so far is only a part of one branch of a larger conceptual framework
for organizing methods of studying human behavior or action. In this framework, a theory
and its methods constitute a lens through which the subject matter is explored. A major
difference between physical science and human science is that the investigator always
remains an outsider to the subject matter in the former 38, whereas in the study of human
behavior, the investigator simultaneously constitutes part of the subject matter. Interesting
results arise from this overlap between the actor and the investigator. In particular, the
actor can hold different views of behavioral phenomena from the investigator’s views as we
shall see later. The next section sketches one lens of the broader platform that our agenda
aims to construct.

Lens 1: Action characterized as movement
All human behavior comprises actions. Viewing an action as a movement between two
points, we define it as follows:

Definition: An action is a movement from state A to state B,
where A and B can be specifiable (denoted as 𝐴𝐴̇ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵)̇ or
nonspecifiable (denoted as 𝐴𝐴̃ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵� ) states. A pair of
beginning-end states (𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵) is a situation.

An actor looking at an action (emic view) through Lens 1 faces one of four possible
situations, labeled S1 to S4 in the following descriptions:
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S1: 𝐴𝐴̇ → 𝐵𝐵̇ – Physical laws are directly applicable. All cases outlined in Table 1 fall in
this situation. The observable outcome is binary in that the actor either succeeds or

fails to arrive at 𝐵𝐵̇.

S2: 𝐴𝐴̃ → 𝐵𝐵̇ – Wishes, ambitions, and dreams exemplify this situation. No action is
taken, but the end is imagined or anticipated. Once the action is taken to achieve
them, S2 collapses into S1.
S3: 𝐴𝐴̇ → 𝐵𝐵� – Examples are job offers or marriage proposals for which an action is
initiated but outcomes are uncertain. Judgment and decisions occur by using

specifiable proxies for the possible endings.
S4: 𝐴𝐴̇ = 𝐵𝐵̇ �𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴̃ = 𝐵𝐵� � – Inaction or null action. It can be deliberate or not,

corresponding to conscious and subconscious cases of inaction, respectively. This
differentiation might be of use to those policymakers who want to tap into defaults.

Note that a modeler (etic view) specifies beginnings and ends, and therefore formally deals
with S1 only. Our argument is that S1 modeling will be more effective when modelers
initially confine their focus to the physical laws. Giving cognition and social-psychological
attributes of humans the top priority limits the scope for physical formalization. We do not
suggest abandoning the existing methods; rather, we present a platform of unifying lenses
that offers, for potentially every method of studying human behavior, a shared basis for
communicating with each other.
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The big picture

The general conceptualization of “movement” in Lens 1 creates a worldview useful for
describing and understanding human behavior. Table 2 lists two more lenses that generate
other worldviews and insights: Lens 2 (labelled “match”) and Lens 3 (labelled
“construction”). The labels correspond to the focal principle of investigation that figuratively
constitutes the respective lens. As alluded to in the preceding section, two non-identical
strands of questions arise from the perspectives of actors versus modelers. A lens can be
used by both actors and modelers. In previous sections, taking the role of a modeler, we first
formulate six specific items by focusing on the physical characteristics of the action
configured by Lens 1 (Table 1). Then, we view the action through Lens 1 from the
perspective of an actor to extract meaningful combinations of beginnings and ends with
respect to specifiability. This work continues by exploring the subject matter through
different lenses, each affording the modeler different working tools. So far, we have
conceptualized three lenses, which are listed in Table 2 along with their related concepts
and elaborations.
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Table 2: Organizing methods of modeling human behavior through different lenses.
The core principle
that describes the
method of study

Related concepts

Discipline of
modeler

Lens 1: Movement
The observed
behavior is
configured as a
movement from A
to B, where A and B
represent nonspecifiable states.
A pair of states
(𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵) is a situation
(S).
Binary outcomes
(success or failure)
result from
following rules.

Math & Computer
Science

Lens 2: Match
An observed
behavior results
from a perceived
match between the
mind (m) and task
environment (e).

Lens 3: Construction
The observed
behavior is the
starting point of the
reconstruction of
the path moving
backwards.

Characterization of
the environment can
be objective or
subjective.
Success results from
an accurate match of
m and e.

Reasonable
behavior follows
consistent rules.

Perceptions (of e)
lead to different
judgments.
Psychology

Success constitutes
achieving a
preferred outcome
by optimizing a
quantifiable metric,
such as Max Utility
or Min Cost.
Economics

These are the steps we have taken so far. First, we chose a law of physics, the principle of
least action, to develop a proposition and definition that constitute a physics-based platform
for decomposing observed phenomenon. Table 1 depicts the current effort to extend this
development, which falls under Lens 1 in the broader platform. Some attempts exist in
cognitive science to derive particular cognitive models from perception 39 and other
universals 40,41, or to reconcile physics-based principles used in cognitive models 42. Our plan
is more general; it reverses the order of the study of human behavior by starting from the
physical core rather than from cognition and other human faculties. The plan is to
identify/develop connections between different lenses that enable them to communicate
with one another by analogy. For example, consider intuition and deliberation, which are
viewed as two cognitive capacities in Lens 2. One possible analogy to Lens 1 is: if intuition is
12

one cognitive medium and deliberation is another, then arriving at a decision using both is
like the lifeguard running across a sandy beach (analogous to rapid intuitive engagement
first) and then swimming in the water (deliberating next, at a slower speed). Each “medium”
affords a different speed analogous to the cognitive effort needed for intuition and for
deliberation; and the efficiency of behavior arises from taking the longer distance (using
more of one cognitive capacity) at a higher speed (where the cognitive medium operates
with more ease.) That is, humans switching between intuition and deliberation tend to “stay
longer in the faster medium”. The benefit of generating these mappings is the creation of a
tractable platform for interdisciplinary exchange and collaboration.

Discussion and remarks

At the outset, we sought to understand the reason for and meaning of behaviors taken from
three different examples. The human lifeguard, the ants, and the inanimate photons—all
tend to follow the same law of refraction (Snell-Descartes law, or its precedents in earlier
forms by several scientists, including Ptolemy and Ibn Sahl43), albeit with different degrees of
precision. The precision of correspondence to this law is greatest in the physical domain and
diminishes for ants and humans. Optimization in the form of principle of least action is a
fundamental organizing principle of the universe. There is no reason to think that the matter
and energy that acquire biological properties (ants) or even higher faculties (humans) cease
to be subject to the universal laws of physics. Given that economizing on action is a
fundamental property of the universe, ants and lifeguards do not need their cognitive
endowments for this purpose any more than the photons that do so without any such
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endowments. For this reason, we propose a perspective on observations from all domains
that share this common core.

Biology endows the animate world with attributes, tendencies, cognitive faculties, and even
intentions, purposes, and teleologies absent in the inanimate world. We humans are
especially proud of our exceptional capabilities in this regard and count ourselves as
standing apart from all other species at the top of the pyramid. Irrespective of whether we
count ourselves as part of the animal world, the additions of biological, social, and
psychological endowments bring additional elements to observed behavior absent in the
core physical tier. It is no surprise then that photons follow Snell–Descartes’ law quite
precisely, but that for ants and lifeguards the law provides only a central tendency or basin
of attraction.

In summary, physical laws can explain only a part of observational variation in biological and
social-psychological tiers. To explain the remainder arising from this greater complexity, we
need to account for biological principles (e.g., in the case of ants) and for biological, social,
cultural, and psychological aspects (e.g., in the case of the lifeguard). At the same time, the
order proposed in this perspective reverses the conventional approach of seeking
explanations for human behavior in sociocultural and psychological elements before
resorting to biology and almost never dipping into the physical laws at the core. This
proposed order generates a platform for extensive consideration of existing, well-configured
physical laws at the level at which they apply and implies disengagement from them at the
outer tiers.
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Based on a minimal definition of action as movement, we propose a framework for a
stepwise study of human behavior that begins with the physical aspects of observed
behavior, then expands to biological, and thereafter to social, cultural, and psychological
attributes in search of explaining the remaining behavioral variations. A corollary to our
definition is that the transition from physics to biology (and from biology to social and
psychological exploration) calls for alternative, domain-specific, nonphysical formalizations.
This perspective sketches out an initial blueprint for pursuing an agenda of considering
actions in various domains/tiers in an overarching conceptual platform. It is our hope that
this approach will produce a fruitful structure for stimulating interdisciplinary discussion of
the existing methods of investigating behavior and generating new methods. From a
methodological angle, our platform generates investigation potential akin to what reverse
Bayesian analysis brought to Bayesian analysis 44,45,46.

We emphasize that ours is not a reductionist proposal to claim that everything can be
explained by physics or by anything else. Rather, we suggest that physical laws deserve the
first chance to explain observations from animate and inanimate worlds because matter and
energy included in biological domains do not lose their physicality by virtue of the added
DNA, brain, higher faculties, and society in which individuals grow up and live. The benefit of
starting at the physical core and remaining within the borders of this first tier is to eliminate
the necessity for modelers who inevitably use physical forms to justify the relevance of this
work to human behavior.
This perspective is not intended as a guideline for others to follow. Instead, we attempt to
consider new approaches to thinking, investigating and categorizing the study of human
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behavior. Our hope is to elicit feedback, suggestions, and criticism that will further this
objective.
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